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osting by EAbstract Post-traumatic headache (PTH) is a common and disabling symptom secondary to the
traumatic event. It is known that assault is associated with a wide range of physical symptoms
including PTH. In this work, the general causation approach provided by the Hill criteria is
described as an assessment tool for speciﬁc causation with regards to PTH and sexual assault.
Time-dependent models of probability and, in-turn, relative risk are described as quantitative algo-
rithms for addressing inductive and abductive conclusions of causation in forensic science.
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Post-traumatic headache (PTH) is a difﬁcult condition to eval-
uate epidemiologically because of variations in presentation,
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lsevierthat patients with direct head trauma may develop persisting
headache, with approximately 15% of such patients with mild
head injury complaining of PTH at 3 months.1 PTH has been
identiﬁed as frequent chronic pain sequelae of assault, includ-
ing that of sexual assault.2 In a study of chronic pain in a com-
munity sample of 292 women who had recently separated from
their abusive partners (<20 months), more than one-third
experienced high disability pain including PTH as measured
by Von Korff’s Chronic Pain Grade.3
Headache is also a prominent feature of neck injury resulting
from physical trauma including whiplash trauma resulting from
car crashes.4,5 In a recent report of the random sampling of 30–
44 year-old Norwegians, the annual rate of chronic headache
due to whiplash trauma or post-traumatic headache was found
to be nearly the same, with around 1 in 260 suffering from one
or the other.6 Post-concussive symptoms may persist after mild
head injury as indicated in a report from a clinic in the United
Kingdomwhere the common complaintswere ranked as fatigue,
36 M.D. Freeman, S.S. Kohlesheadache, dizziness, irritability, sleep disturbances, poor con-
centration and poor memory.7
Because PTH is at times allegedly due to the negligence or
malfeasance of another individual, and the condition is rarely
captured by medical imaging and other conventional means of
identifying injury (unless there is fracture or intracranial bleed-
ing), there may be polarization of expert opinions regarding
the most probable cause of the headaches. A treating clinician
will most typically take a history from the patient, and if they
have new headache complaints that they did not have prior to
the injury event then an attribution of causation is made. An ex-
pert who is defending against a claim of chronic injury may ﬁnd
in the pre-trauma history of the patient prior complaints of
headaches, and thus conclude that the onset of the headaches
only coincidedwith the trauma, and that the traumadid not alter
the natural history of the headaches. Fact ﬁnders are thus left at
an evidentiary impasse, without a standard bywhich to compare
the validity of the conﬂicting opinions.
A large part of this difﬁculty is the lack of general familiarity
amongst those trained in forensic and clinical medicine with the
standards of epidemiologic (general) causation, and how they
may be systematically applied in cases of speciﬁc (individual)
causation. The objectives here are to describe these criteria
and how they may be used in a forensic setting to evaluate dis-
puted causation in a case of alleged post-traumatic headache
resulting from physical assault or another cause in which fault
is due to the negligence of someone other than the victim. In
addition, a time-dependent probability models are presented
as a means to quantify relative risk. Such means of quantifying
causal probabilities are important tools in forensic science.2. Causal association
Abroadly accepted deﬁnition of causation is that a speciﬁc event
serves as an antecedent event or condition that was necessary for
the occurrence of a speciﬁc disease or injury at themoment that it
occurred, given that other conditions are ﬁxed.8 In other words,
the cause of a disease or injury event is an event or condition that
preceded the disease or injury andwithout which the disease or in-
jury would not have occurred (at the time at which it occurred).
The scientiﬁc basis for general and speciﬁc determinations of
cause and effect were introduced through the rules set forth by
the philosopher David Hume and the inductive writings of John
Stuart Mill in the 18th and 19th centuries, respectively.9,10
In the current era, a practical approach to causation was
described in a systematic fashion by Sir Austin Bradford-Hill
in 1965.11 Hill outlined nine criteria by which population-
based determinations of cause and effect could be made when
there is substantial epidemiologic evidence linking a disease or
injury with an exposure.12 The Hill Criteria have served as the
seminal basis from which virtually all subsequent systematic
approaches to general (population) and speciﬁc (individual)
causation have been derived, including those for a variety of
injuries such as traumatic brain injury, carpal tunnel syn-
drome, needle stick injuries, and spinal disk injuries, among
others.13–16
Hill’s original nine criteria are as follows:
1. Strength of association: A strong association is more likely
to indicate a causal relationship than is a modest or weak
association. Strength of association is generally consideredto be the most important determinant of causation. Most
simply stated, a strong association is more likely to indicate
a causal relationship than is a modest or weak association.
Strength of association can be measured in general causa-
tion by the percentage decrease of an illness or injury in
society if the injury cause were to be eliminated.8 This is
also known as the etiologic fraction that the particular cause
contributes to the total societal burden of the disease.
Strength of association is typically assessed by relative risk
(RR), in which the risk of the injury or disease associated
with the suspected cause is evaluated and compared with
all other possible causes, and given as a ratio. An RR of
>2.0 is the equivalent of a probability of causation of
>50%, meaning that it is more probable than not that
the suspected causal relationship is true. An example calcu-
lation applying this metric to PTH and physical assault will
be described in the next section.
2. Consistency: In general causation, the repetitive observa-
tion of a causal relationship in different circumstances
strengthens the causal inference. For example, smoking dif-
ferent brands of cigarettes results in the same disease. Con-
sistency may be said to be present in speciﬁc causation if
other individuals have been observed clinically with the
same outcome following substantially similar exposures.
3. Speciﬁcity: In general causation, speciﬁcity refers to the
degree to which a factor is associated with a particular out-
come or population. In his original paper, Hill discussed the
rare condition of scrotal cancer among the unique profes-
sion of chimney sweeps as an example of speciﬁcity. Speci-
ﬁcity is less a necessary factor for causation and more of a
quantiﬁed variable of interest. For example, in a drug-
related death, the drug may have a low speciﬁcity for death,
as a very small proportion of deaths are caused by overdose
of the drug, and the cause of death is often multifactorial.
In contrast, a decedent found with a circular depression
in his skull and a hammer nearby has an injury that is
highly speciﬁc for a blow to the head with a speciﬁc ham-
mer. Thus, speciﬁcity has value in speciﬁc causation when
it is present, but a lack of speciﬁcity does not imply lack
of causation.
4. Temporality: For this criterion to be satisﬁed, the potential
causal factor must precede the outcome it is assumed to
affect, and the outcome cannot either occur before it is
physiologically feasible or after too great of a latency per-
iod. Temporality is the one factor that must always be pres-
ent in general and speciﬁc causation in order to conclude
that a cause and effect relationship is present.
5. Biological gradient: The injury outcome increases propor-
tionately with increasing dose of exposure (also known as
dose–response). This principle makes more sense when
applied to general causation than speciﬁc causation, in that
the fact that a lower dose of exposure will sicken or injure
fewer people than a higher dose has little or no meaning to
a causal investigation in the case of an individual who has
fallen ill after a low dose.
6. Plausibility: For both general and speciﬁc causation, plau-
sibility refers to the degree to which the observed associa-
tion can be explained by known scientiﬁc principles. Hill
did not put much weight in plausibility, having commented
that a hypothesized disease cause that is thought to be
implausible today may be found to be plausible at some
time in the future as a result of new scientiﬁc inquiry. The
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lished implausibility (impossibility or 0% probability). For
example, a brain tumor found via medical imaging on the
day of a head trauma and loss of consciousness is implau-
sibly related to the trauma due to the nature of the disease
and injury mechanisms. A common error in speciﬁc causa-
tion is to consider a rare outcome to be the same as an
implausible outcome. If a causal correlation is determined
solely based upon the temporal association between an
exposure and outcome, but implausibility is well established
by a biologic disconnection, then the post hoc ergo propter
hoc fallacy has been committed. Because the association is
implausible, the inference of causation is fallacious. Just
as important, however is the recognition of the false asser-
tion of the post hoc fallacy, in which a rare outcome is
improperly used as a basis to assert implausibility, and cau-
sation is improperly rejected in the presence of other criteria
suggestive of causation.
7. Coherence: A causal conclusion should not fundamentally
contradict present substantive knowledge – it should ‘‘make
sense’’ given current knowledge. This is highly subjective;
what does not make sense to one practitioner may make
sense to another, depending on differences in clinical expe-
rience. Coherence is meant to be a liberal, rather than lim-
iting criterion.
8. Experiment: In some cases there may be evidence from ran-
domized experiments on animals or humans, although in
most cases of injury there will not.
9. Analogy: An analogous exposure and outcome may be
translatable to the circumstances of a previously unex-
plored causal investigation.3. Application of the Hill criteria to post-traumatic headache and
sexual assault
For practical determinations of speciﬁc causation of PTH in a
forensic setting (cause and effect in individuals as evaluated for
a legal matter) Hill’s criteria can be grouped into two major
forensic questions: criteria that answer the question ‘‘could
the exposure have caused the disease or injury outcome in this
case?’’ and those that answer the question ‘‘did the exposure
cause the disease or injury outcome in this case?’’ To this end,
Hill’s criteria further grouped into three causal milestones, as
follows:
3.1. Biologic plausibility
This criterion is meant to demonstrate whether or not the
exposure could have caused the disease or injury outcome,
regardless of how often, and is an amalgam of Hill’s plausibil-
ity, coherence, consistency, speciﬁcity, biologic gradient, anal-
ogy, and experiment criteria. No single factor must be present
to establish biologic plausibility, which simply means that the
probability of a cause and effect cannot be said to be 0% (that
it is implausible). As noted previously, an example of implau-
sibility would be in which a brain tumor is discovered the day
of a car crash and a head trauma. Clearly, it would be implau-
sible to develop a brain tumor in a single day and as a result of
trauma. In practice, this criterion is considered met if there is
an absence of clearly established implausibility.In applying the criteria that comprise biological plausibility
to the evaluation of the relationship between persisting head-
aches and trauma, the ﬁrst question that often arises is whether
there is an injury force threshold for PTH. A number of
authors have attempted to establish injury thresholds by point-
ing to the results of human volunteer crash testing and other
activities that have been shown to be tolerable without injury.
Such conclusions are based on logical fallacy, in that the dem-
onstration that no injury is plausible in a selected population
(that study subjects can tolerate a low speed crash without sus-
taining injury) is improperly generalized to the entire popula-
tion by the sweeping conclusion that it is impossible to
sustain injury in a low speed crash.17 The epidemiologic con-
cept of the asymptote, that there is no way to know at what
point the nth most fragile member of the population falls on
an injury probability versus traumatic force curve, dictates that
implausibility cannot be concluded for virtually any degree of
forceful loading of the head as a possible cause of PTH (Fig. 1).
The conclusion begs the question (for some) as to whether a
light tap on the head with a ﬁnger can cause PTH, and the an-
swer is almost certainly not, but then again such a question
would not arise in a forensic setting. For most clinicians, the
recognition of the potential for injury of a described traumatic
event in a patient’s history is something like the well known
quote of US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart regarding
the deﬁnition of obscenity, that one ‘‘knows it when one sees
it.’’18 With no reliably established injury thresholds for PTH,
the prevailing standard for judging plausibility is clinician
common sense (the coherence criterion as described above).
Further, because of the lack of implausibility for PTH fol-
lowing virtually any traumatic head loading scenario or emo-
tionally traumatic event (i.e. sexual assault), there is no need
for the clinician to be able to quantify head loading forces in
order to make an evaluation of plausibility in evaluating cau-
sation of PTH. As a result a post hoc biomechanical analysis of
an injury mechanism may be helpful to fully describe how an
injury occurred, such an analysis cannot be useful in a determi-
nation as to whether an injury occurred. Thus, an adequate his-
tory that there has been a head loading event during a sexual
assault is adequate for the satisfaction of the biologic plausibil-
ity criterion.
3.2. Temporality
This criterion is the ﬁrst step in establishing whether a biolog-
ically plausible exposure during an assault resulted in a case of
PTH. Each case must be evaluated individually, but as a gen-
eral rule, the headaches must start after the trauma and within
a reasonable amount of time. In the case of a head trauma with
a loss of consciousness, for example, a delay of one year from
the last symptoms of head injury and the development of head-
aches would not be in keeping with a reasonable period of la-
tency for PTH. On the other hand, headache is not always the
ﬁrst and foremost concern of a patient with a head injury fol-
lowing an assault, and thus a careful history is required to
establish when the headaches began, relative to the time of
the assault.19 Some degree of headache is a highly prevalent
ﬁnding in the general population; more than 60% of men
and 80% of women will have experienced a headache in the
year preceding an injury with the potential to cause PTH.20
Thus it is reasonable that a patient who complains of headache
Figure 1 Hypothetical relationship between the probability of injury as associated with accumulated trauma during physical assault. The
likelihood that anyone in a population of those experiencing large accumulated forces (and thus represented by a position on the curve as
it asymptotically approaches 100%) would not be injured is considered implausible.
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ma. A careful history of the nature of the headache with regard
to accumulated intensity, distribution, frequency, and duration
both following and, if necessary, preceding a trauma is critical
to determining if there has been a substantive change in a pa-
tient’s history that is temporally associated with the trauma.
3.3. Strength of causal association
This is the ﬁnal step in determining whether an exposure
caused an injury outcome in which the risk of the condition
relative to the suspected exposure is compared to the compet-
ing risk of the condition had the exposure not occurred, given
the timeframe of the exposure. If a competing traumatic expo-
sure has taken place then a comparison of dose may be appro-
priate, and the temporal relationship of the competing
exposure must be compared to that of the exposure that is un-
der investigation.
Often, the only other explanation for an injury or disease
outcome aside from a suspected exposure is the coincidental
onset of the condition (the probability the condition was going
to occur at the same time regardless of the injury exposure).
The comparison of the risk of the condition associated with
the suspected exposure to the risk of the condition absent
the exposure during the period of time that the exposure oc-
curred is evaluated with the ratio between risks or probabili-
ties, the relative risk (RR) as mentioned previously. For the
clinician the quantiﬁcation of RR is not typically feasible;
but a qualitative assessment of competing risks can sufﬁce in
the place of the RR.
4. Relative risk as a quantitative metric for speciﬁc causation
The speciﬁc causation approach allows one to develop a math-
ematical deﬁnition of RR in order to answer the question ‘‘did
exposure A cause condition B ?’’ by comparing all of the known
and potential causes of B given the temporal relationship be-
tween A and B. Here, the probability that a condition B re-
sulted from a ‘‘prime causal suspect’’ As out of n known
alternative causes plus the inﬂuence of coincidence can berepresented with the following RR calculation for the causal
relationship of ðBjAsÞ:21
Relative risk ðB Asj Þ ¼ PðB Asj ÞPn
i¼1P BjAaið Þ þ P Bj Act2
 
 !
ð1Þ
in which PðB Asj Þ is the probability of the diagnosed condition
B given exposure to prime causal suspect As;
Pn
i¼1P BjAaið Þ is
the sum of the risk of all known alternative plausible causes
of B occurring in the same time frame as As as i goes from 1
to n alternative causes; and P Bj Ac
t2
 
is the probability of the
coincidental occurrence of B per the time span between prime
causal suspect As and the ﬁrst clinical sign of condition B, des-
ignated as t. Taking into account the joint probability of the
temporal alignment of the theoretically independent events
As and B, the t
2 factor in the denominator represents the ran-
dom match probability associated with coincidental cause Ac.
The resulting algorithm provides a metric for assessing the rel-
ative nature of causal inﬂuences while taking into account the
biomechanically or epidemiologically derived injury risk values
in the numerator of the RR calculation as well as the duration
of time between exposure to the prime causal suspect and the
injury outcome.
The temporal relationship between a traumatic exposure
and the development of PTH becomes the most important fac-
tor in evaluating the strength of the causal association between
the two. This is primarily because the closer the temporal rela-
tionship between trauma and development of symptoms, the
lower the probability that another unknown or unseen cause
has coincidentally intervened. Time-dependent probabilities
of association with speciﬁc trigger-events can be modeled by
known biologically-relevant functions such that
PT ¼ PðB Asj Þ for input into Eq. (1). These types of functions
describe a hypothetical diminishing inﬂuence of the most prob-
able association from an initial traumatic exposure (applied at
t= 0) through time, and hence a temporal relationship.22 A
biologically relevant Gaussian (bell-shaped) distribution func-
tion can be used to describe a delayed or limited initial de-
crease in temporal association between a suspected injury
cause and an injury outcome. The following mathematical
relationship characterizes molecular diffusion coefﬁcients
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physics applications including evaluation of traumatic head in-
jury, but also can be applied to the time-dependant risk of
PTH from assault:23
PT ¼ P0et2=ð2k2GÞ ð2Þ
For the PTH scenario, the time constant kG can be speciﬁed for
the facts in a speciﬁc assault and P0 is an acute baseline prob-
ability at t= 0, typically 100%, meaning that the maximum
risk of acquisition of PTH is greatest right after the assault,
and the risk decreases with time along a bell-shaped distribu-
tion (Fig. 2).
The relationships described in Eqs. (1) and (2) can be ap-
plied to make causal determinations of PTH relative to the
timing of a traumatic exposure. In the patient who develops
PTH within a matter of hours to days of a head trauma, unless
the patient is a frequent and chronic headache sufferer prior to
the traumatic assault, the temporal proximity is such that a
coincidental onset of headache is far less probable than is a
causal relationship between the injury and the PTH. In cases
in which there is a greater period of latency between the trau-
ma and the onset of headache, more scrutiny is required to as-
sess the probability of coincidence, with particular attention
paid to pre-assault history of headache. The question the
forensic examiner must ask is ‘‘had the trauma not occurred,
would one predict that these headaches would be present ?’’
Unless this question can be answered yes then the RR fa-
vors the trauma as the cause of the headaches. A weighted
odds ratio (OR), similar to the RR metric of Eq. (1), has been
previously used to evaluate the general causal link between
sexual assault and headache, while controlling for age and le-
vel of education. A mean OR= 1.70 (95% conﬁdence inter-
val = 1.40–2.07) indicated a statistically strong association
between PTH and sexual assault.2 A similar analysis has been
performed on PTH secondary to trauma associated with war-
fare, with a ﬁnding of an OR = 2.25, indicating an association
between combat-related physical assault and headaches (95%
conﬁdence interval = 1.17–4.33).24
In speciﬁc causation, strength of association is determined
by the lack of more probable alternative or competingFigure 2 The modeled temporal association of speciﬁc causation
between a physical assault (at time, t= 0) and PTH, during a
given latency period. The Gaussian function of Eq. (2) was
optimized such that kG = 3.0 for the example scenario.explanations, and this is somewhat different than in general
causation. An example would be a death occurring 1 h follow-
ing the administration of an intravenous drug. The death may
be very rarely associated with the drug (e.g. 1 death per
100,000 doses), and thus the strength of association, relative
to general causation, is very low (only a very small proportion
of total deaths would be avoided if the drug became unavail-
able). However, if the probability that the other cause of death
that would have been likely to act coincidentally between the
time of the drug administration and the death (e.g. infection,
sudden cardiac death, etc.) is even lower, then the relative
strength of association of the drug to the death, in comparison
to other causes, is very high. This concept of balancing or con-
textualizing the probabilities is the key to evaluation of speciﬁc
causation.5. Conclusion
Determinations of cause and effect in forensic cases of headache
following an assault and other trauma can be approached sys-
tematically as described herein. The most critical concepts for
the forensic examiner to keep in mind is that of relative risk,
and the important role that time between the trauma and onset
of symptoms plays in dictating the strength of a causal
relationship.References
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